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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Earl Wayne Steele appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The district court Decision on Petition for Post Conviction Relief describes
Steele's underlying criminal case and appellate proceedings as follows:
In State v. Steele, Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2007-0001541,
Petitioner Earl Wayne Steele was indicted on three counts of Lewd
Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen and one count of Sexual Abuse of a
Child Under the age of Sixteen Years. On March 13, 2008, he reached a
plea agreement with the State. The State filed an amended indictment
that changed Count I to Sexual Abuse Of A Minor Child Under The Age Of
Sixteen Years, a Felony in violation of I.C. § 18-1506. Defendant pled
guilty to Count 1 and the remaining counts were dismissed.[il Defendant
was sentenced on May 15, 2008 to seven years fixed followed by eighteen
years indeterminate. He appealed that sentence claiming the sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum and that the sentence was an abuse of
discretion. The sentence was affirmed. Pursuant to a subsequent Rule
35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, the court on July 1, 2010 reduced
the sentence to seven years fixed followed by eight years indeterminate,
which was the maximum sentence permitted at the time the crime was
committed.
(R., pp.173-174.)
Steele filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief presenting twelve claims.
(R., pp.4-17.) After the district court appointed counsel to represent Steele (R., p.23),
the state filed an Answer to Steele's petition (R., pp.33-35), and the district court filed a

Steele pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
p.175.)
1
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(R.,

Notice of Intent to Dismiss (R., pp.37-39). Steele's newly appointed counsel then filed
an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief (R., ppA4-48), and the state responded
by filing an Answer (R., pp.54-57) and a Motion for Summary Dismissal of Amended
Petition (R., pp.58-59).
Steele filed a "Motion to Amend Petioner's [sic] Amended Petition" (R., pp.78-80),
and a proposed "Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction" (R., p.81) in which he
sought to present the following two claims:

A.

Petitioner's acceptance of the Alford plea was induced by two linked
contrary acts of counsel: delusive advice and failure to advise defendant
on relevant law attached to the plea.

B.

Counsel acknowledged defendant's participation in a Psychosexual
evaluation despite recognizing the conclusion with Petitioner's state of
mind.

(R., p.82 (verbatim).) After a hearing, the district court granted Steele's motion to file a
second amended petition (Tr., p.33, L.23 - p.34, L.3), and clarified that the second
amended petition replaced the two previously filed petitions and made the state's
previous summary dismissal motions moot (Tr., p.36, Ls.9-14; p.38, L.23 - p.39, LA).
On April 7, 2011, an evidentiary hearing on Steele's second amended petition
was held in which Steele and his trial counsel, Lawrence Smith, testified.

(Tr., pA2,

L.15 - p.163, L.10.) The district court subsequently entered its "Decision on Petition for
Post Conviction Relief" (R., pp.173-181), denying both claims presented in Steele's
second amended petition. Steele timely appealed. (R., pp.182-184.)
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ISSUES
Steele states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Should post-conviction relief have been granted because the plea
entered in ignorance of the consequences violated the state and
federal constitutional guarantees of due process?

2.

Should post-conviction relief have been granted because Mr. Steele
was denied the state and federal constitutional rights to effective
assistance of counsel?

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Steele failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing?

3

ARGUMENT
Steele Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For PostConviction Relief

A.

Introduction
On appeal, Steele first argues that "[t]he failure to advise [him] in a sex offense

case of the direct consequences of an Alford plea on the penalty that would be imposed
and ultimately served resulted in the entry of a plea that was not voluntary, knowing and
intelligent in violation of the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process."
(Appellant's Brief, p.?)

Steele specifically contends his Alford plea, which permitted

him to plead guilty without admitting guilt, was invalid because his trial counsel failed to
advise him "of the consequences of an Alford plea to a sex offense in terms of impact
on the psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed and the sentence ultimately
served." (Appellant's Brief, p.g.) In his second issue, Steele contends the district court
erred by denying his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because,
he argues, "he demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not
advise him of the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his innocence through
an Alford plea." (ld., p.13.)
Steele has failed to provide any authority to support the underlying premise that
his post-plea denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility were the inevitable
consequences of his Alford plea. 2 Because Steele has not supported his underlying
premise with any authority, this Court should refuse to consider Steele's wholly
In turn, Steele argues that his post-plea denials of guilt and refusals to accept
responsibility led to a negative psychosexual evaluation, a harsher sentence imposed,
and a longer sentence to be served. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.)
2
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derivative argument that his Alford plea was invalid because of trial counsel's failure to
advise him of such consequences. Even if considered on appeal, Steele has failed to
show it was his Alford plea that resulted in any of the consequences he describes.
Further, assuming one or more of the consequences Steele cites were caused by his

Alford plea, they were not direct consequences of such plea and Steele did not have to
be advised about them in order to enter a constitutionally valid plea.
Steele's second argument on appeal - ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails because it too relies on the legally unsupported and erroneous premise that his

Alford plea made it inevitable that he would continue to deny guilt and refuse to accept
responsibility after his plea was entered. Also, Steele failed to present any evidence,
much less show by a preponderance of evidence, that his trial counsel's performance
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to inform Steele of the consequences of his

Alford plea he alleges.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings

in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700,
703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,838,172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007);
I.C.R. 57(c)).

When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters

findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact
only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by
the district court from those facts.

Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d
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727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely
within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d
108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has
not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939,
940,792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).

C.

The State Did Not Bear Any Burden Of Rebutting Steele's Claim
\.

As an initial evidentiary matter, Steele contends on appeal that "all the averments
in the [second amended petition] must be deemed to be true" because the state did not
file an answer to that pleading. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Steele confuses the role his
verified second amended petition had with his burden of avoiding summary dismissal,
and his burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence once he
obtained an evidentiary hearing.

Steele's verified second amended petition was not

admitted as evidence during (or for) the evidentiary hearing; thus, the state was not
required to rebut it. In Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct.
App. 2005), the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument, explaining:
At the evidentiary hearing, Loveland was required to prove his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence, and
the standard for avoiding summary dismissal, in which the district court
was required to accept his allegations as true, was no longer applicable.
See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909, 894 P.2d 134, 143 (Ct.
App.1995).
Loveland also asserts that, because the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act permits the district court to accept affidavits as evidence,
his application and affidavits automatically constituted evidence for
purposes of the evidentiary hearing. A verified pleading that sets forth
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evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signator is,
in substance, an affidavit and is accorded the same probative force as an
affidavit. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593, 861 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Ct.
App. 1993). However, the purpose of pleadings is to frame the issues
upon which a cause is to be tried. Unless introduced into evidence,
pleadings are not evidence. That Loveland's application was verified did
not dispense with the need to prove his allegations.
At a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the court may receive
proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence and may
order the applicant brought before it for the hearing. I.C. § 19-4907.
Section 19-4907, therefore, modifies the rules of evidence insofar as it
permits the admission of certain forms of hearsay that might otherwise be
inadmissible.
See I.R.E. 801-05.
However, Section 19-4907's
modification of what evidence can be admitted during a post-conviction
evidentiary hearing does not establish that all potentially admissible
documents are automatically admitted into evidence. Thus, Section 194907 does not support Loveland's position that his verified application and
affidavits were automatically introduced into evidence at the evidentiary
hearing. Further, the adoption of such an interpretation would deprive the
parties of the opportunity to object to the admissibility of any such proof.
See I.R.E. 103.
The district court specifically indicated which documents were being
made part of the record at the evidentiary hearing. Those documents
included portions of the record from the underlying criminal proceeding
and did not include any of the pleadings in the post-conviction action.
Loveland never offered his pleadings or affidavits in an attempt to
introduce them into evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
Because
Loveland declined to present any evidence that his counsel ignored his
request to file a direct appeal, we conclude that the district court did not
err in dismissing his application.
(Emphasis added.)
As in Loveland, there is no indication in the record that the district court in
Steele's post-conviction case admitted his verified second amended petition and
supporting affidavit into evidence to be considered at the evidentiary hearing. Contrary
to Steele's assertion, the averments made in his second amended petition and
supporting affidavit are not "deemed to be true." (See Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The only
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relevant evidence in regard to Steele's claim is what was actually presented as
testimony, or admitted as exhibits, during the evidentiary hearing.

D.

Steele Has Failed To Demonstrate That His Guilty Plea, Entered Pursuant to
North Carolina v. Alford, Was Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary
1.

Steele's Underlying Premise That His Continued Denial Of Guilt And
Refusal To Accept Responsibility For His Crime Were Inevitable Results
Of His Alford Plea Is Not Supported By Authority And Is Contrary To
Applicable Law

Steele challenges the validity of his guilty plea by arguing, as the underlying
premise to his principle argument, that because the form of his plea under Alford
permitted him to plead guilty without admitting factual guilt, he was committed and/or
entitled to deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime from that point on.
(See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.)

In turn, Steele argues that his continuous

denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility for his crime led to direct and negative
consequences in regard to his (a) psychosexual evaluation (b) sentence imposed, and
(c) sentence ultimately served. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.) Contrary to
Steele's presupposition, his Alford plea did not grant him license to thereafter deny guilt
and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime, and he has failed to present any
authority to the contrary.
Steele's underlying premise is, in essence, that an Alford plea constitutes a
continuing agreement by the trial court and the state that a defendant will be entitled to
deny guilt and refuse accountability for his or her actions long after the plea is entered,
and that doing so is an inevitable result of such a plea. (See Appellant's Brief, p.1 0 ("So
long as an Alford plea is entered, the defendant is asserting his innocence. There is no
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way to avoid this short of entering a different plea, a straight-up guilty plea which would
require an innocent defendant to commit perjury.,,3; pp.13-14 ("Here, the law is clear that
failure to take responsibility for a charged sex offense by admitting guilt at the
psychosexual evaluation and before the court will, in nearly every single case, result in
a harsher sentence.").

Contrary to Steele's argument, nothing prevented him from

admitting guilt and accepting responsibility for his crime after he entered his Alford plea,
and he has provided no authority to the contrary. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp. 712.) In fact, Steele did attempt to accept some or all responsibility for his crime at his
sentencing hearing, which belies his assertion that his continuous denial of guilt and
refusal to accept responsibility for his crime were the inevitable results of his Alford

3 Rather than requiring "an innocent defendant to commit perjury" by pleading straightup, it seems more likely that an innocent defendant would choose to go to trial.
Steele came close to accepting responsibility for his crime during his sentencing
hearing, telling the court:

4

... First of all, Your Honor, I would like to apologize to my daughter. If I
had touched her inappropriately, I didn't mean to or realize that I had. I
had wrote a letter here. Your Honor, while thinking I was - it was truly
possible of doing such an offense in a black out and while incarcerated I
was cleaning the church ....
Your Honor, I'm taking this psychosexual evaluation. I answered
the questions as to my situation. That is why the examiner came to the
conclusion of high risk. Your Honor, knowing that there was some kind of
inappropriate touching, if I were 100 percent sure of what I did in the
offense, I would have answered all of the questions and my interview
would have been differently ....
I know I need sex offender treatment to help me answer my own
questions. I know I have personality traits and issues that need treatment.

9

Steele provides no legal authority that supports his contention that his supposed
post-plea denials of guilt and refusals to accept responsibility (see id.) were caused by,
or necessarily resulted from, his Alford plea (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12).
In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 966 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered. Earlier formulations of
this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was not supported with
argument and authority. A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking. Zichko
supported this assignment of error with argument but no authority.
Consequently, he waived this issue on appeal.
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citations omitted); see I.A.R. 35. Steele has
faiied to present any authority to support his underlying premise that his Alford plea
made it inevitable he would continue to deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for
his crime. Accordingly, this Court should refuse to consider Steele's wholly dependent
and derivative argument that his Alford plea was invalid because his trial counsel failed
to advise him that his subsequent denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility
would have negative consequences in regard to his psychosexual evaluation, the
sentence imposed, and the sentence actually served.
Even if considered on appeal, this Court should reject Steele's underlying
argument that his Alford plea inevitably resulted in his post-plea denials of guilt and
refusals to accept responsibility for his crime. Whether Steele accepted responsibility

Your Honor, I do take full responsibility as my own letter that I wrote
you says.
(R., p.112 (p.28, L.8 - p.29, L.14).)
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and admitted guilt after he entered his Alford plea was completely his choice to make.
Discussing the possibility Steele would be rehabilitated while in prison, the district court
explained, "[i]t is Steele's choice to deny in prison and therefore be denied the
opportunity for rehabilitation." (R., p.178.) Although the court did not specifically state
that Steele was also free to admit guilt and accept responsibility during his
psychosexual evaluation and at sentencing, because he was free to do so, the court's
denial of Steele's first post-conviction claim must nonetheless be upheld. See State v.
White, 102 Idaho 924, 925, 644 P.2d 318, 319 (1982) ("This Court has held that where
a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason given by the trial court for admitting the
evidence may have been incorrect."); State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d
1286,1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld
if it is capable of being upheld on any theory).
In State v. Alston, 534 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), the North Carolina Court
of Appeals, relying in part on State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 896 P. 2d 1002, 1004 (Ct.
App. 1995), explained, in the context of a challenge to a probation revocation
proceeding, that an Alford plea does not result in any special privileges beyond the plea
entry hearing:
... [A]n "Alford plea" constitutes "a guilty plea in the same way that
a plea of nolo contendere or no contest is a guilty plea." State ex reI.
Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis.2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698, 706 (1998); see
Alford, 400 US. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 167-68, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 171 (no "material
difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal
act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence"); [People v.J
Birdsong, 958 P.2d [1124J at 1130 [Colo. 1998] ("An Alford plea is to be
treated as a guilty plea and a sentence may be imposed accordingly.").
As a consequence, in accepting an "Alford plea" as
11

a concession to [a] defendant, [the trial court accords that
defendant] no implications or assurances as to future
revocation proceedings.

Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1129. In other words, an "Alford plea" is in no way
"infused with any special promises," Warren, 579 N.W.2d at 711, nor does
acceptance thereof constitute "a promise that a defendant will never have
to admit his guilt," id.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Warren:
[a] defendant's protestations of innocence under an Alford
plea extend only to the plea itself.

... "There is nothing inherent in the nature of an Alford plea
that gives a defendant any rights, or promises any
limitations, with respect to the punishment imposed after the
conviction. "
... Put simply, an Alford plea is not the saving grace for
defendants who wish to maintain their complete innocence.
Rather, it is a device that defendants may call upon to avoid
the expense, stress and embarrassment of trial and to limit
one's exposure to punishment [and it is] not the saving grace
for defendants who wish to maintain their complete
innocence.

Id. at 707 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see generally Smith v.
Com., 27 Va.App. 357, 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry,
127 Idaho 94, 896 P. 2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995)) ("'[ A]lthough an
Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of
innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions ... [but
the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime,
including [the] defendant's lack of remorse.' ").
Alston, 534 S.E.2d at 669-670.
The principles expressed in Alston show that an Alford plea does not allow any
preferential treatment of a defendant after the plea is entered. Adopting the language of
Alston, "[Steele's] protestations of innocence under an Alford plea extend only to the
12

plea itself."

kl

(quoting Warren v. Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d 698, 707 (1998)). Because

Steele was not entitled by virtue of the form of his guilty plea to thereafter deny guilt and
refuse to accept responsibility for his crime, his underlying argument is erroneous. As a
result, Steele's resultant argument that his Alford plea necessarily caused him adverse
sentencing consequences is erroneous. Because the premise underlying Steele's issue
has no merit, Steele's first issue is fatally flawed, and this Court should reject it outright.
In sum, Steele has failed to present any authority supporting his underlying
argument that his Alford plea inevitably resulted in his post-plea denials of guilt and
refusals to accept responsibility for his crime, and, under Zichko, this Court should
refuse to consider Steele's wholly dependent issue on appeal. Further, as the Alston
decision states, Steele's "protestations of innocence" inherent in his Alford plea "extend
only to the plea itself" - not beyond. Alston, 534 S.E.2d at 670. Because Steele's first
issue is entirely contingent upon the erroneous underlying premise that his Alford plea
made it inevitable he would continue to deny guilt and accept responsibility for his
crime, Steele has failed to show the district court erred in denying his first claim. See
White, 102 Idaho at 925, 644 P.2d at 319; Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 P.2d at 1288.

2.

Even Assuming The Consequences Of Steele's Alford Plea Were As He
Alleges, They Were Not "Direct" Consequences Under Heredia And He
Was Not Required To Be Advised About Them Before Entering A Valid
Plea

"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant." Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 481, 180 P.3d 511, 520 (Ct.
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App. 2008) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 (2004)). "For a
guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered into
in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,
527, 164 P.3d 798, 807 (2007) (citing State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d
1193, 1194 (2007». Determining whether a plea is voluntary involves three inquiries:
"(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood
the consequences of pleading guilty." kL (citing State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557
P.2d 626, 628 (1976».

''The trial court is not required to inform a defendant of

consequences that are collateral or indirect." Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, 156 P.3d at
1195 (citing State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002);
and Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99-101, 982 P.2d 931, 934-36 (1999».
Relying on Heredia, Steele argues that the consequences his Alford plea had on
his psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed, and the sentence actually served,
are direct consequences which he was required to be informed about in order for his
Alford plea to be considered knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-

12.) Contrary to Steele's argument, there were no consequences, direct or indirect, of
his Alford plea in the ways he alleges; therefore, review under Heredia to determine if
the consequences are direct or indirect is pointless. As previously discussed (see §
D.1, supra), Steele has failed to show that the negative consequences he points to were
caused by his Alford plea instead of his own post-plea decisions to continue to deny
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guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime. Inasmuch as Steele has failed to
show any adverse consequences of his Alford plea, review under Heredia is
unnecessary to determine if such unrelated "consequences" are direct or indirect.
Even assuming one or more consequences flowed from Steele's Alford plea in
the manner he alleges, they are not direct consequences under Heredia. 5 In Heredia,
the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the three-factor test for determining if a
consequence is direct or collateral previously set forth in Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-101,982
P.2d at 934-36: "(1) the defendant's power to prevent the consequence; (2) the punitive
or remedial nature of the consequence; and (3) the amount of control the sentencing
judge has over imposing the consequence."

Heredia, 144 Idaho at 98, 156 P.3d at

"These factors indicate that a direct consequence is involved where a judge has

1196.

a large amount of control over the consequence and the defendant has no power to
prevent its occurrence."

lil

Application of these factors shows that the consequences

of Steele's Alford plea upon his psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed, and
the sentence actually served, are indirect or collateral.
First, and as previously discussed, whether Steele accepted responsibility and
admitted guilt after he entered his Alford plea was completely within his own power to
decide.

See §O.1, supra.

As the district court explained in regard to Steele's

5
Although the district court did not specifically determine that, under Heredia, the
consequences of Steele's Alford plea were indirect and collateral, the court reached
several conclusions consistent with such a finding. In any event, the district court's
ruling should be upheld on the correct legal theory that, under Heredia, the
consequences that Steele alleges resulted from his Alford plea were indirect and
collateral. White, 102 Idaho at 925, 644 P.2d at 319; Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807
P .2d at 1288.
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rehabilitative potential while incarcerated, "[i]t is Steele's choice to deny in prison and
therefore be denied the opportunity for rehabilitation." (R., p.178.) Likewise, Steele had
the ability to admit his guilt and accept responsibility for his crime during his
psychosexual interview and at his sentencing hearing; his Alford plea did not prevent
him from doing so.

(See § 0.1, supra.)

Steele's statement during his sentencing

hearing discredits his argument that his Alford plea locked him into a course of
continuous denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility.

Steele chose at each

point after his plea whether to admit guilt and accept responsibility for his criminal
conduct - his Alford plea was irrelevant to those decisions. The first factor of Heredia,
whether Steele had power to control the consequences of his Alford plea, clearly favors
a finding that those consequences are indirect or collateral.
The second factor under Heredia is whether the consequences of Steele's Alford
plea are punitive or remedial. Heredia, 144 Idaho at 98, 156 P.3d at 1196. As explained
previously (see § 0.1, supra), Steele's Alford plea did not cause any of the
consequences he claims. Rather, Steele's voluntary choices to deny guilt and refuse to
accept responsibility (to the extent he actually did so) during his psychosexual
evaluation, his sentencing hearing, and while incarcerated, are responsible for any
negative consequences he may have encountered. Even if Steele's Alford plea resulted
in the consequences he now asserts, the functions provided by a psychosexual
evaluation, probation, and parole are plainly remedial in nature, not punitive.

See

Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 307, 392 P.2d 552, 561-562 (1964) (emphasis added)
("Because of their humane provisions and their highly remedial nature, statutes
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providing for suspension of sentence and probation are universally given liberal
construction."); United States v. Pinjuv, 218 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9 th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9 th Cir. 1977) ("Revocation of parole is remedial
rather than punitive, since it seeks to protect the welfare of parolees and the safety of
society.

The termination of parole results in a deprivation of liberty and thus is a

grievous loss to the parolee. But the harshness of parole revocation does not alter its
remedial nature.").
The third Heredia factor is the amount of control the sentencing judge had over
imposing the consequences Steele complains of.

lsi

The consequence Steele cites in

regard to his psychosexual evaluation is its conclusion that he was a high risk to
reoffend.

(Appellant's Brief, p.10 ("District Court's statements at sentencing that the

most troubling aspect of his case was [Steele's] failure to admit factual guilt, that as a
result of that failure he was evaluated to be a high risk for reoffense"); p.11 ("Mr. Steele
faced the other consequences of a poorer psychosexual evaluation"); see PSI, p.69
(finding Steele a high risk to reoffend).) The district court plainly had no control over
whether Steele's psychosexual evaluation rated him a higher risk to reoffend because
he entered an Alford plea. That control rested solely in the hands of the evaluator and
Steele himself. Next, as discussed, because the consequence Steele alleges his Alford
plea had on the sentence imposed is based on his fallacious premise that his trial
counsel promised him a rider, there was no consequence the sentencing judge could
have controlled in that regard. Finally, the sentencing judge has absolutely no control
over any consequence Steele's Alford plea may have over the sentence he actually
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serves while in confinement.

As the district court explained, "[n]either the court nor

counsel can control the decisions of the Department of Corrections or the Board of
Pardons and Parole." (R., p.178.) The third Heredia factor weighs in favor of a finding
that the consequences of Steele's Alford plea are indirect.
Application of the three Heredia factors supports a finding that the consequences
Steele complains about are indirect or collateral. Therefore, Steele's Alford plea was
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently without him being advised of those
potential indirect consequences. Steele has failed to demonstrate that the district court
erred in denying his claim that his Alford plea was not valid.

E.

Steele Failed To Demonstrate That His Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective
Assistance
1.

Steele's Underlying Premise To His Second Issue, That His Post-Plea
Denials Of Guilt And Refusals To Accept Responsibility For His Crime
Were Inevitable Results Of His Alford Plea, Is Not Supported By Authority
And Runs Counter To Applicable Law

In his second issue on appeal, Steele argues:
In this case, [he] proved deficient performance because he
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not
advise him of the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his
innocence through an Alford plea. Counsel was not just merely inaccurate
in predicting the likely outcome. Counsel failed altogether to recognize
and advise his client that in a sex case maintaining one's innocence will
lead to a poor psychosexual evaluation and inevitability a harsher
sentence than would be imposed ....

Here, the law is clear that failure to take responsibility for a charged
sex offense by admitting guilt at the psychosexual evaluation and before
the court will, in nearly every single case, result in a harsher sentence. ..
. Thus, counsel had an absolute duty to give Mr. Steele correct advice
that his denial of guilt would result in a greater sentence.
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(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14 (citations omitted, emphasis added).)
Although it may be more likely that the failure to admit guilt and accept
responsibility after entering an Alford plea will result in a harsher sentence, Steele again
fails to provide any authority to support his underlying premise that his Alford plea
caused him to steadfastly continue to deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for
his crime. 6

In regard to Steele's first issue on appeal, the state has previously

discussed, in § D.1, supra, his failure to present any viable authority to support that
underlying premise, under both Zichko and the merits of the argument. The state relies
upon that analysis and argument to explain why this Court should refuse to consider, or
deny on the merits, Steele's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it is
predicated on the same unsupported and meritless underlying premise. In short, Steele
freely chose, after he entered his Alford plea, whether he would continue to deny guilt
and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime.

2.

Steele Failed To Show That His Trial Counsel Was Constitutionally
Ineffective

At the beginning of the plea entry hearing, the prosecutor explained that the plea
agreement called for Steele to enter an Alford plea of guilt to the amended charge of
sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (I.C. § 18-1506) and obtain a SANE

Steele's citation to Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (Ct. App. 2006), is
inapposite. (See Appellant's Brief, p.14.) In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court held
that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to obtain accurate advice from counsel
about the Fifth Amendment right to invoke silence and decline participation in a
psychosexual evaluation because such evaluation "may" support a harsher sentence.
lQ.,. at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. Estrada does not in any way support Steele's contention
that an Alford plea inevitably results in a harsher sentence.
6

19

(psychosexual) evaluation prior to sentencing. (R., p.151 (p.i, L.15 - p.3, L.4).) The
plea agreement allowed for "open sentencing" and the state agreed not to file additional
charges for past incidents with respect to two males related to Steele. (R., p.151 (p.2,
L.25 - p.3, L.15).) Steele was asked by the district judge whether "any other promises
[have] been made to [him] beyond what's been told to [the court] today in the
courtroom?", and answered "[n]o, ma'am."

(R., p.151 (p.4, Ls.15-18).)

Steele's

attorney acknowledged he had discussed with Steele "his rights, defenses and possible
consequences to him of a plea of guilty," and Steele affirmed he had "sufficient time to
discuss this case and all of its ramifications" with his trial attorney, and did not desire
more time to do so. (R., p.152 (p.5, L.24 - p.6, L.5).)
On appeal, Steele claims he "proved deficient performance because he
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not advise him of
the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his innocence through an Alford
plea."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

Steele further contends his trial counsel "failed

altogether to recognize and advise [him] that in a sex case maintaining one's innocence
will lead to a poor psychosexual evaluation and inevitability [sic] a harsher sentence
than would otherwise be imposed." (Id.) Even assuming the consequences of Steele's

Alford plea were as alleged, Steele failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by allegedly failing to inform Steele of such consequences.
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a.

Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Claims Involving Guilty Pleas

Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel, in order to prevail, the petitioner "must establish that his counsel
was deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice to the
claimant." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992)
(citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989».

"There is a strong

presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of professional
assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989».

~

(citing State v. Charboneau,

In addition, it is well-established that "[a] fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective
at the time." Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 700 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (ellipses original».
To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must "show a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance."
McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703 (citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312,
955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998».

'''A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.'"

~

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in
order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
21

and would have insisted on going to triaL"

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)

(footnote and citations omitted)? The focus of a determination of whether a defendant
would not have pleaded guilty is the defendant's state of mind at the time the guilty plea
was entered. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 852, 103 P.3d 460, 465 (2004) ("In
other words, the likelihood that without counsel's errors a defendant mayor may not
have been able to prevail at trial is relevant only to the extent it sheds light on the
defendant's state of mind when he pleaded guilty."); see Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
"Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that
a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances."
Padilla v. Kentucky, _

U.S. _ , 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-

Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). Application of the standards to the evidence presented
demonstrates the district court did not err in denying Steele's ineffective assistance
claim.

In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, the Supreme Court hypothesized that, where an
attorney has failed to discover or investigate potentially eXCUlpatory evidence, the
assessment of whether a defendant would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty
"will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have
changed the outcome of a triaL" As explained in McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 852,
103 P.3d 460,465 (2004), in contrast to the scenario described in Hill:
7

[HJere the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel involves issues surrounding
the reservations of rights agreement, and has nothing to do with issues
that would be raised at trial. Therefore, here we simply apply the test
articulated in Hill requiring a defendant "show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to triaL" Id.
140 Idaho at 852, 103 P.3d at 465.
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b.

Steele Has Failed To Demonstrate His Trial Counsel's Performance
Was Deficient

In apparent reliance on Padilla v. Kentucky, _

U.S. _ _ , 130 S.Ct. 1473

(2010), Steele contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to advise
Steele "of the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his innocence through an
Alford plea," and "that in a sex caseL] maintaining one's innocence will lead to a poor
psychosexual evaluation and inevitability [sic] a harsher sentence than would otherwise
be imposed.,,8 (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Padilla does not support Steele's claim.
The issue in Padilla was whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel requires a criminal defense attorney to advise his or her noncitizen client whether the client's plea carries the risk of deportation. l.Q." at _ , 130
S.Ct. at 1477-78. Addressing this issue in the first instance, the lower court held that
Padilla's counsel had no obligation to give Padilla correct advice, or even to advise him
at all, that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his deportation
from this country because, the court reasoned, deportation was "merely a 'collateral
consequence'" of Padilla's guilty plea. l.Q." at _ , 130 S.Ct. at 1478 (citation omitted).

8 Steele also cites Estrada, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833, in support of his claim that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that his Alford plea would result
in a negative psychosexual evaluation and a harsher sentence. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.13-14.) As discussed, Steele has failed to show that his Alford plea compelled him
to thereafter deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime. Therefore,
Steele cannot show that his Alford plea caused the consequences he complains about.
Further, Estrada requires defense counsel to advise defendants who undergo a
court-ordered psychosexual evaluation that they have a Fifth Amendment right to invoke
silence and decline to participate in such evaluation. Inasmuch as Steele's plea
agreement required him to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, Estrada does not
apply. (See R., p.151 (p.1, L.15 - p.3, L.4).)
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The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating, "We

have never applied a

distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally 'reasonable professional assistance' required under Strickland [v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)]." Padilla, _

U.S. at _ , 130 S.Ct. at 1481.

The Court discussed the practical effects of deportation and stated its view that
"[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close
connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a
collateral consequence."

lJi at _ , 130 S.Ct. at 1482. The Court ultimately concluded,

however, that whether counsel performed deficiently in failing to correctly advise Padilla
of the deportation consequences of his plea turned not on the question of whether
deportation is a direct or collateral consequence of a guilty plea, but rather on whether
counsel's performance was objectively reasonable "under prevailing professional
norms."

lJi at _ , 130 S.Ct. at 1482 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Holding that

"[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must
advise her client regarding the risk of deportation," the Supreme Court determined that
the allegations in Padilla's petition were sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance
prong of Strickland. 9 Padilla, _

U.S. at _ , 130 S.Ct. at 1482-83.

First, and most significantly, Steele presented no testimony or evidence during
his evidentiary hearing in regard to whether the "weight of prevailing professional
norms" supports his contention that trial counsel must advise their clients that, if they
enter an Alford plea to a sex offense, they will receive a negative psychosexual
Padilla specifically held that "counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a
risk of deportation." Padilla, _
U.S. at __ , 130 S.Ct. at 1486.

9
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evaluation and a harsher sentence. (See generally Tr., pp.41-162.) Based on Steele's
failure to present such evidence, he failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient under Strickland. See Maxwell v. Larkins, 2010 WL 2680333
*10 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (no clear direction from professional organizations on the subject of
advising defendants in regard to sex offender registries or Sexually Violent Predator Act
procedures).
Additionally, in Padilla the Supreme Court noted that "recent changes in our
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of
noncitizen offenders."

Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481 (emphasis added).

In contrast,

Steele's Alford plea, by itself, caused no adverse consequence on his psychosexual
evaluation or his sentence. (See §§ 0.1, E.1, supra.) Therefore, Padilla's requirement
of advisements, which was based upon the existence of some risk of a deportation
consequence, has no application to Steele's case. See Padilla, _

U.S. at _ _ , 130

S.Ct. at 1483 ("When the law is not succinct and straightforward ... a criminal defense
attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.

But when the deportation

consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is
equally clear."); Brown v. Goodwin, 2010 WL 1930574 *13 (D.N.J. 2010) ("However,
while Padilla's implications for cases involving removal are clear, the holding of Padilla
seems not importable - either entirely or, at the very least, not readily importable - into
scenarios involving collateral consequences other than deportation."); Maxwell, 2010
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WL 2680333 at *10 (commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator in Missouri is not as
automatic as deportation was in Padilla).
Steele has failed to demonstrate, both in the district court and on appeal, that his
trial counsel provided deficient performance under Strickland.

c.

Steele Has Failed To Demonstrate He Was Prejudiced By Trial
Counsel's Performance

The gist of Steele's claim is that he would have gone to trial if his trial counsel
had advised him that by entering an Alford plea he would, thereafter, inevitably deny
guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime, which would lead to a poorer
psychosexual evaluation and harsher sentence.

(See generally Appellant's Brief,

pp.12-16.) Assuming, arguendo, Steele is able to demonstrate deficient performance
by his trial counsel, he must, under Strickland, show there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Steele has failed to show he would have gone to
trial absent trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance.
During the evidentiary hearing, Steele testified he pled guilty because he thought
he was going to receive a retained jurisdiction and probation; otherwise he would have
insisted on going to trial. (Tr., p.51, Ls.1-10; p.53, Ls.2-4; p.62, L.11 - p.63, L.2; p.79,
Ls.13-15; p.87, Ls.6-9; p.101, Ls.14-18.)

However, Steele's mere allegation that he

would not have pled guilty absent counsel's deficient performance is not sufficient,
standing alone, to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 852,
103 P.3d at 464; Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 93, 137 P.3d 475, 480 (Ct. App. 2006)
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(same).

The relevant focus in determining whether Steele would have gone to trial

absent trial counsel's deficient performance, is what his state of mind was when he pled
guilty. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 852, 103 P.3d at 465; see Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. A review
of the evidentiary hearing testimony of Steele's trial counsel and Steele's sentence
hearing statements show that his state of mind at the time he entered his Alford plea
was to admit guilt, with the explanation that he was too intoxicated at the time of the
offense to recall it, and to accept responsibility for his offense.

At the evidentiary

hearing, Steele's trial counsel testified that he did not think Steele was going to have
any problem with accepting responsibility for his crime, as he explained in the following
colloquy with the prosecutor:
Q.

Had you read psychosexual evaluations before -

A.

Yes.

Q.
-- where people had taken responsibility but couldn't remember
exactly what happened?

A.

Yes.

Q.
And do you remember whether or not those were always high risk
to reoffend?

A.

I couldn't say. I don't think they're always high risk, though.

Q.
Now did you think that showing remorse was going to be any
problem for Mr. Steele?

A.

No.

Q.

How come?
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A.
Well, he had indicated to me - while he indicated that he had no
recollection of the acts, he realized that he had caused great damage to
his family, to his own wife, to his family, by not being able to be present to
be a role model to help out in their lives, to provide support, and so I know
he was remorseful in a number of ways.
Q.

And that's what you knew before he pled guilty?

A.

Yes.

(Tr., p.146, L.24 - p.148, L.7.)
Steele's comments to the district court during the sentencing hearing support trial
counsel's view of what Steele's state of mind was when he entered his Alford plea. In
those comments, Steele essentially admitted that he may have committed the offense
but had no recall of it due to being intoxicated, and accepted some or all responsibility
for the offense.

See fn. 4, supra.

In light of Steele's trial counsel's testimony and

Steele's admissions of guilt (without recall of his actions) and acceptance of
responsibility for his crime, his naked allegation that he would not have pled guilty if his
trial counsel would have informed him that his psychosexual evaluation and sentence
would be negatively impacted by his Alford plea rings hollow.
Moreover, Steele has failed to demonstrate why going to trial instead of entering
an Alford plea would have been a rational decision. Padilla, _
1473, 1485 (2010).

U.S. _ _ , 130 S.Ct.

He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise

him that "an Alford plea represented ... the worse [sic] of the possible pleas because
he would lose all the constitutional rights associated with trial and be convicted and
sentenced, but he would also not get the benefit in sentencing and later parole

decisions of having acknowledged his guilt and thus rendered himself amenable to
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rehabilitation."

(Appellant's Brief, p.14 (emphasis added).)

If, as Steele seems to

contend on appeal, one of his goals was to avoid a harsher sentence resulting from his
continued denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility produced by his Alford plea,
going to trial would not have aided his cause. Steele has not explained why he would
have admitted guilt and accepted responsibility for his crime after a jury trial, but could
not do so after entering an Alford plea.
Steele has failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland because he did not
provide any evidence, apart from his mere allegation, showing that he would have made
a rational decision to go to trial if his trial counsel would have advised him properly.
Instead, the testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing serves only to
refute Steele's claim.

d.

Because The Denial Of Steele's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Claim Was Correct, Although For Different Reasons Than The
District Court Articulated, It Must Be Affirmed

The district court's reasons for denying Steele's claim that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance differ from the above analysis showing Steele failed to
demonstrate, under Strickland, his trial counsel's performance was deficient, and that
such performance was prejudicial. 1O Inasmuch as the district court's denial of Steele's

10

The district court held:
Generally [Steele] alleges his counsel should not have allowed him to
submit to a psychosexual evaluation; he was denied the right to
meaningful adversarial testing at sentencing; the evaluation is
presumptively unreliable; Steele has thirty lay witnesses that contradict the
doctor's diagnosis, and Dr. Johnsons' [sic] diagnosis was tainted by
Steele's claim of innocence and Alford plea. Steele has failed to prove his
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ineffectiveness claim can be upheld on grounds different than the court articulated, it
must be upheld. White, 102 Idaho at 925,644 P.2d at 319.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's decision,
following an evidentiary hearing, denying Steele's post-conviction petition claims.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2012.

counsel was ineffective in these areas. The evaluation was performed by
a neutral professional and the evaluation was a requirement of his plea
agreement to get the reduction he wanted. The evaluation provides much
information in the form of Steele's history as well as testing. Dr. Johnsons'
[sic] conclusions were based on substantial information about the
defendant. There is no evidence that any of Steele's thirty witnesses are
qualified in psychosexual evaluations.
Steele claims his counsel relinquished his role as advocate when
he allowed Steele to submit to a psychosexual evaluation, despite
knowing what the conclusions would be. There is no evidence Mr. Smith
knew what the conclusions would be. He, the court and the prosecutor
learned of the conclusions after the evaluation was completed.
(R, p.1BO.)
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